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Comment

Down the Rabbit Hole: Crawford v. LVNV
Funding, LLC Upends the Role of the Fair
Debt Collection Practices Act in
Consumer Bankruptcy

"If I had a world of my own, everything would be nonsense. Nothing
would be what it is because everything would be what it isn't. And
contrary-wise; what it is it wouldn't be, and what it wouldn't be, it
would. You see?"'
I.

INTRODUCTION

For decades courts have faced the issue of whether the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act (the FDCPA)2 applies to filing proofs of claims
in consumer bankruptcy cases. 3 Courts have historically been cautious

1. ALICE INWONDERLAND (Walt Disney Productions 1951).
2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692-169 2p (2012).
3. See, e.g., Simmons v. Roundup Funding, LLC, 622 F.3d 93,96 (2d Cir. 2010); Claudio

v. LVNV Funding, LLC (In re Claudio), 463 B.R. 190, 194 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2012);
McMillen v. Syndicated Office Sys. (In re McMillen), 440 B.R. 907, 913 (Bankr. N.D. Ga.
2010).
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of applying the FDCPA in the realm that the Bankruptcy Code4 covers.'
As such, the majority of courts faced with this question found the answer
to be a resounding "no." However, in Crawford v.LVNV Funding,
LLC,' the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
turned the tide when it held that the filing of a proof of claim on a timebarred debt in Chapter 13 bankruptcy violated the FDCPA. s The court
determined that filing a proof of claim on a debt barred by the applicable
statute of limitations was "unfair, unconscionable, deceptive and
In doing so, the
misleading" to the least-sophisticated consumer.'
0
court's decision created a circuit split." As a result, debtors in the
Eleventh Circuit may recover certain damages under the FDCPA that
are unavailable under the Bankruptcy Code. Furthermore, Crawford
may significantly impact the practices of consumer debt collectors, which
previously relied on a debtor's failure to object to proofs of claim under
§ 502 of the Bankruptcy Code 2 13to collect on debts that would be
otherwise invalid under state law.
II.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Crawford v. LVNV Funding,LLC began on February 2, 2008, when
Stanley Crawford filed a petition for relief under Chapter 13 of the
Bankruptcy Code in the Middle District of Alabama. 4 Crawford was
indebted to Heilig-Meyers, a furniture company, for $2,037.99 on an
account opened in the late 1990s.1 5 Heilig-Meyers charged off the debt
in 1999; however, in September of 2001, Heilig-Meyers sold the debt to
a consumer debt collection company associated with LVNV Funding,

4. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1502 (2012).
5. See, e.g., Simmons, 622 F.3d at 95.
6. E.g., Simmons, 622 F.3d at 96; In re Claudio,463 BR. at 194; In re McMillen, 440
B.R. at 914.
7. 758 F.3d 1254 (11th Cir. 2014).

8. Id. at 1261.
9. Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692c-1692f (2012)) (internal quotations omitted).
10. See id. at 1262; but cf Simmons, 622 F.3d at 96 (holding that the FDCPA did not
apply to filing of proofs of claim in bankruptcy).
11. Crawford, 758 F.3d at 1262.
12. 11 U.S.C. § 502 (2012).
13. See Crawford, 758 F.3d at 1259.
14. Id. at 1257. This petition was Crawford's second attempt at receiving relief under
the Bankruptcy Code; Crawford had first filed a Chapter 13 petition in 2000, which was
dismissed in August of 2001. Complaint Seeking Damages in Adversary Proceeding for

Stay Violation and Federal Laws at 4, Crawford v. LVNV Funding, LLC, No. 08-30192DHW (Bankr. M.D. Ala. May 3, 2012) [hereafter Complaint].
15. Crawford, 758 F.3d at 1257. Heilig-Meyers subsequently filed for bankruptcy on
August 16, 2000. Complaint, supra note 14, at 4.
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LLC (LVNV). On May 21, 2008, LVNV filed a proof of claim on the
unsecured Heilig-Meyers debt in Crawford's bankruptcy case.'"
The core issue with LVNV's proof of claim was that the last transaction on the Heilig-Meyers account took place on October 26, 2001. Due
to Alabama's three-year statute of limitations on the enforcement of a
debt, the time to collect the Heilig-Meyers debt ran in October of 2004,
rendering the debt unenforceable in both state and federal court.
Therefore, when LVNV filed its proof of claim, it did so on a debt where
its recovery had expired four years earlier. Despite this, both Crawford
and the bankruptcy trustee failed to object to LVNV's claim during the
Chapter 13 proceeding, and LVNV was paid from the bankruptcy estate
for the Heilig-Meyers debt. Crawford did not learn of the untimeliness
of LVNV's claim until four years after the proof of claim was filed.17
In May 2012, Crawford objected to the enforceability of LVNV's
claim."i Crawford sought to recover damages and filed an adversary
proceeding, listing three companies as defendants: LVNV, Resurgent
Capital Services, L.P. (Resurgent), and PRA Receivables Management,
LLC (PRA). Crawford claimed that LVNV was in the business of
purchasing portfolios of consumer debt owned by credit grantors; that
Resurgent operated as a master servicer for LNNV; and that PRA was
in the business of collecting consumer debts associated with LVNV's
The basis of the adversary proceeding was
business practices."i
Crawford's allegation that LVNV filed proofs of claim on stale, timebarred debts as a routine business practice in violation of the FDCPA.2 °
The bankruptcy court dismissed the adversary proceeding.2" The
court relied on Simpson v. PRA Receivables Management, LLC (In re
Simpson)22 to conclude the filing of a proof of claim in a consumer
bankruptcy does not violate the FDCPA, even if the claim is timebarred.' Crawford appealed the finding to the United States District
Court for the Middle District of Alabama.24 However, the district court
affirmed the bankruptcy court and held that a proof of claim filed on a

16.
17.
18.

Crawford, 758 F.3d at 1257; see also Complaint, supra note 14, at 5.
Crawford, 758 F.3d at 1257, 1259.
Id.

19. Complaint, supra note 14, at 2-3. Crawford included Resurgent and PRA because
LVNV allegedly filed its proof of claim through Resurgent in May of 2008 and transferred

the claim to PRA in September 2010. Crawford, 758 F.3d at 1257 n.2.
20. Crawford, 758 F.3d at 1257.
21. Order Dismissing Adversary Proceeding at 1-2, Crawford v. LVNV Funding, LLC,
No. 08-30192-DHW (Bankr. M.D. Ala. July 12, 2012).
22. No. 08-00344-TOM-13, 2008 Bankr. LEXIS 2457 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. Aug. 29, 2008).
23. Order Dismissing Adversary Proceeding, supra note 21, at 1.
24. Crawford, 758 F.3d at 1257.
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debt barred by the statute of limitations does not qualify as a violation
of the FDCPA.25 Crawford then appealed to the Eleventh Circuit.2"
Analogizing a lawsuit filed on a time-barred debt to a proof of claim for
a time-barred debt, the court held that filing a time-barred proof of claim
is "an indirect means of collecting a debt" and is "unfair, unconscionable,
deceptive, and misleading," rendering it a violation of the FDCPA.27 In
a unanimous decision, the court reversed the district court's dismissal of
Crawford's complaint and remanded the case for further proceedings.2"
III.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

Prior to the FDCPA, consumer debtors had inadequate protective
remedies under state and federal law.29 Enacted in 1977, the FDCPA
is a subsection of the Consumer Credit Protection Act (the CCPA), °
and was Congress's response to overwhelming evidence of abusive,

deceptive, and unfair practices implemented by debt collectors."

The

FDCPA was intended to balance the interests of consumers and debt
collectors. 2 In doing so, Congress sought to enact a scheme that would
eliminate abusive debt collection practices, incentivize non-abusive debt
collection practices, and most importantly, protect consumers. 33 Courts
utilize the FDCPA, in combination with other consumer-friendly
statutes, to curb rampant abuse by consumer debt collection agencies.'

25.
66169,
26.
27.

Crawford v. LVNV Funding, LLC, No. 2:12-CV-729-WKW, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
at *6 (M.D. Ala. May 9, 2013).
Crawford, 758 F.3d at 1257.
Id. at 1261, 1262 (quoting 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692c-1692f) (internal quotation marks

omitted).
28. Id. at 1262.
29. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e) (2012). "It is the purpose of this subchapter to eliminate
abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors, to insure that those debt collectors who
refrain from using abusive debt collection practices are not competitively disadvantaged,
and to promote consistent State action to protect consumers against debt collection abuses."
Id.
30.
31.
32.

15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1693r (2012).
See Mace v. Van Ru Credit Corp., 109 F.3d 338, 343 (7th Cir. 1997).
See 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e).

33. See id. It is important to note that the FDCPA applies solely to consumer debt;
commercial debts are not covered by the FDCPA's protections. See Goldman v. Cohen, 445
F.3d 152, 153-54 (2d Cir. 2006).

34. See FTC, 2004 Annual Report: Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 1 (2004),
available at httpJ/www.ftc.gov/sites/default/fflesdocuments/reports/fair-debt-collectionpractices-act-annual-report-congress-federal-trade-commission-enforcement/2004
fdcpareport.pdf. For example, the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act implements
protections to victims of identity theft or fraud. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681m(g), 1681s-2 (2012).
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The FDCPA applies solely to the conduct of debt collectors, as
distinguished from the actions of creditors.3 " It is a strict-liability
statute construed in favor of consumers to fulfill its protective purpose.3" To recover under the FDCPA, a debtor must prove four
elements: (1) the debtor is either a natural person injured by a violation
of the FDCPA, or meets the definition of a consumer 7 within the
meaning of the FDCPA; (2) the debt3" arose out of a transaction that
was entered into for personal, family, or household purposes; (3) the
alleged violator is a debt collector; and (4) the debt collector has violated
a provision of the FDCPA. 39 However, an injured consumer need not
show intentional conduct on the part of the debt collector." The
FDCPA allows an individual who successfully proves a violation to
collect his actual damages, additional damages up to one thousand
dollars, the costs of the action, and reasonable attorney fees.4'
Additionally, courts impose legal standards to determine whether the
actions of a debt collector are false, deceptive, misleading, harassing or
abusive, or an unfair practice. 42 The standards to determine whether
a consumer collector has violated the FDCPA are the "least-sophisticated
consumer standard" 3 and the unsophisticated but "reasonable consumer[]" standard. 44 Under the least-sophisticated consumer standard,

35. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e).
36.) Blair v. Sherman Acquisition, No. 04-C-4718, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25106, at *6
(N.D. Ill. Dec. 9, 2004).
37. Consumer is defined as "any natural person obligated or allegedly obligated to pay
any debt." 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(3) (2012). However, a consumer under the FDCPA is not
limited to the individual debtor; the term consumer also includes the individual's spouse,
executor, administrator, and, if the individual is a minor or deemed legally incompetent,
the individual's parent or guardian. 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(d) (2012).
38. Under the FDCPA, "debt" refers to "any obligation or alleged obligation of a
consumer to pay money arising out of a transaction in which the money, property,
insurance, or services which are the subject of the transaction are primarily for personal,
family, or household purposes." 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5) (2012).
39. Christy v. EOS CCA, 905 F. Supp. 2d 648, 652 (E.D. Pa. 2012); see also 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1692a, 1692k (2012). In 1986, Congress amended the FDCPA to add attorneys to the
definition of a debt collector under § 1692a(6). See Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291, 299
(1995).
40. See Hess v. Cohen & Slamowitz LLP, 637 F.3d 117, 125 (2d Cir. 2011).
41. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(aXl)-(3).
42. See generally LeBlanc v. Unifund CCR Partners, 601 F.3d 1185, 1193-94 (11th Cir.
2010); Jeter v. Credit Bureau, 760 F.2d 1168, 1172-73 (11th Cir. 1985).
43. See LeBlanc, 601 F.3d at 1193-94 (internal quotation marks omitted) (holding that
the "least-sophisticated consumer standard" applied to evaluating claims under § 1692e
and § 1692f of FDCPA).
44. See Jeter,760 F.2d at 1172. The unsophisticated but reasonable consumer standard
assumed "that the debtor is 'uninformed, naive, or trusting,' and that statements are not
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which is the most commonly used,45 the court asks whether the leastsophisticated consumer would have been deceived by the debt collector's
conduct.46
Sections 1692e 47 and 1692' of the FDCPA effect the purpose of
protecting consumer debtors through several prohibitions on the
behavior of consumer debt collectors. 4' First, § 1692e prohibits a debt
collector from using "any false, deceptive, or misleading representation
or means" in connection with the collection of debts.5 ° Section 1692e
also includes a non-exclusive list of sixteen ways a debt collector may
violate the statute.51 Second, § 1692f prohibits a debt collector from
using unfair or unconscionable means to collect a debt.5 2 These
sections are central to serving the key purpose of the FDCPA and the
CCPA, which is to eliminate practices that contribute to the number of
personal bankruptcies.5 3
In contrast, the purpose behind the Bankruptcy Code is to place the
debtor's property under the control of the court in order to distribute it
equally among creditors.54 To do so, the Bankruptcy Code must
"reconcil[e] competing claims of creditors to property of the debtor's
bankruptcy estate."55 Courts have repeatedly found that the principal
function of the Bankruptcy Code is to determine creditor's rights and
distribute shares of property in a single collective proceeding.56
Under the Bankruptcy Code, a "claim" is the right to payment or the
right to an equitable remedy for a breach of performance, if the breach

confusing or misleading unless a significant fraction of the population would be similarly
misled." Veach v. Sheeks, 316 F.3d 690, 692-93 (7th Cir. 2003) (quoting Pettit v. Retrieval
Masters Creditors Bureau, Inc., 211 F.3d 1057, 1060 (7th Cir. 2000)).
45. See Clomon v. Jackson, 988 F.2d 1314, 1318 (2d Cir. 1993).
46. Jeter, 760 F.2d at 1177.
47. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e (2012).
48. 15 U.S.C. § 1692f (2012).
49. See id. §§ 1692e-1692f.
50. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e.
51. See id. § 1692e(1)-(16). While the list is not exclusive, it includes false representations that the debt collector is affiliated with the United States or any state, false
representations about the amount or status of the debt, and any false representations
regarding the debt collector's identity. See id. § 1692e(1)-(2), (14).
52. 15 U.S.C. § 1692f.
53. 15 U.S.C. § 1692(a), (c) (2012); see also Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U.S. 642, 651
(1974) ("In short, the Consumer Credit Protection Act sought to prevent consumers from
entering bankruptcy in the first place.").
54. See Straton v. New, 283 U.S. 318, 320-21 (1931).
55. City of Joliet v. Bank One, N.A. (In re Green), 210 B.R. 556, 558 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
1997).
56. See In re American Reserve Corp., 840 F.2d 487, 489 (7th Cir. 1988).
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gives rise to a right to payment.5 7 For a creditor to recover from a
debtor's bankruptcy estate, the creditor must file a proof of claim."8 If
a proof of claim is filed in accordance with the bankruptcy rules, it
constitutes prima facie evidence of the validity and the amount of the
creditor's claim. 9 Once prima facie evidence of the creditor's claim is
established, the burden shifts to the debtor to produce evidence sufficient
to rebut the validity of the proof of claim."° A proof of claim is deemed
to be allowed unless a party in interest objects to the proof."' After an
objection to a claim is made, the bankruptcy court will determine the
amount and enforceability of the claim. 2
A debtor is deemed to have a consumer debt under the Bankruptcy
Code if the debt in question resulted from the actions of an individual
for the purpose of providing for that person, that person's family, or
household.6 3 A debtor with consumer debt may apply for relief under
Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code,64 which allows an individual with
a regular, steady income, whose debts do not exceed the statutory limits,
to pay her debts and keep some or all of her property through a
bankruptcy plan.65 A consumer debtor may also find relief under
Chapters 7,66 11,67 and 1268 of the Bankruptcy Code. Once a debtor
seeks relief under the Bankruptcy Code, the provisions of the Code
protect and implement the bankruptcy court's exclusive jurisdiction over
the debtor's property, estate, and bankruptcy case. 69 Damages are
recoverable by a debtor under the Bankruptcy Code, but only in certain
situations.7 °

57. 11 U.S.C. § 101(5XA)-(B) (2012).
58. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 3001(f).
59. Id.; see also In re Sunnybrook Adult Mobile Home Park, Inc., 64 B.R. 365, 367
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1986) (noting the debtor has the burden to rebut the presumption of
validity to a properly filed proof of claim).
60. See Lampe v. Lampe, 665 F.3d 506, 514 (3d Cir. 2011).
61. 11 U.S.C. § 502(a).
62. 11 U.S.C. § 502(b).
63. 11 U.S.C. § 101(8) (2012).
64. 11 U.S.C. ch. 13 (2012); see 11 U.S.C. § 1325 (2012).
65. 11 U.S.C. § 1325.
66. 11 U.S.C. ch. 7 (2012).
67. 11 U.S.C. ch. 11 (2012).

68.

11 U.S.C. ch. 12 (2012).

69. See Brown v. Fox Broad. Co. Kathy Cox (In re Cox), 433 B.R. 911, 920 (Bankr. N.D.
Ga. 2010).
70. See e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 362(k)(1)42) (2012); 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2012).
The court may issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or
appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title. No provision of this title
providing for the raising of an issue by a party in interest shall be construed to
preclude the court from, sua sponte, taking any action or making any determina-
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Prior to the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Crawford v. LVNV Funding,
LLC, the case law was clear that the FDCPA did not apply to proofs of
Several courts have also considered the
claims in bankruptcy."1
applicability of the FDCPA to bankruptcy cases in contexts other than
the filing of proofs of claims.72 There are three circuit court cases,
discussed below, that chronicle the battle courts face in determining
what implications, if any, the FDCPA has in consumer bankruptcy
cases.73 While not all of the cases dealt with proofs of claims, the
decisions set the stage for the holding in Crawford.
In Walls v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.,"' Donna Walls brought a class
action lawsuit against Wells Fargo for attempting to collect her debt
after the debt had been discharged in bankruptcy, in violation of the
discharge injunction under the Bankruptcy Code. Walls alleged a
discharged debtor could pursue claims for recovery simultaneously under
both the Bankruptcy Code and the FDCPA. Walls contended that Wells
Fargo engaged in unfair and unconscionable practices, bringing its
conduct within the ambit of the FDCPA. 75 The United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the Bankruptcy Code provided
its own remedy for violations of the discharge injunction.76 If the court
were to allow a simultaneous claim under the FDCPA, it would permit
Walls to side-step the Bankruptcy Code and achieve a favorable result

tion necessary or appropriate to enforce or implement court orders or rules, or to
prevent an abuse of process.
11 U.S.C. § 105(a). Under § 105(a), courts have the power to impose sanctions and award
debtors damages in actions under the Bankruptcy Code. Id. However, the Bankruptcy
Code itself also provides for the collection of certain damages. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(k)(1).
For example, if a creditor violates the automatic stay, a debtor is entitled to recover actual
damages, costs of litigation, attorney fees, and, under some circumstances, punitive
damages. Id.

71. E.g., Baldwin v. McCalla, Raymer, Padrick, Cobb, Nichols & Clark, L.L.C., No. 98Apr. 29, 1999); B-Real, LLC v.
C-4280, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6933, at *11-12 (N.D. M11.
Rogers, 405 B.R. 428, 432 (M.D. La. 2009).
72. See Kline v. Mortgage Elec. Sec. Sys., 659 F. Supp. 2d 940, 946 (S.D. Ohio 2009)
(determining whether a debt collector violated the FDCPA by, among other allegations,
filing a claim for attorney fees in accordance with a fee-shifting provision in a mortgage);
Gunter v. Columbus Check Cashiers, Inc. (In re Gunter), 334 B.R. 900, 906 (Bankr. S.D.
Ohio 2005) (considering the applicability of the FDCPA to debts discharged under the

Bankruptcy Cede); see also Necci v. Universal Fid. Corp., 297 B.R. 376, 377-78 (E.D. N.Y.
2003) (deciding whether violations of the discharge injunction of the Bankruptcy Code
support a claim for damages under the FDCPA).
73. See infra notes 74-103 and accompanying text.
74. 276 F.3d 502 (9th Cir. 2002).
75. Id. at 504, 505, 510.
76. Id. at 510.
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by going through the back door.77 The Ninth Circuit, therefore,
determined that the Bankruptcy Code's remedial scheme provided the
exclusive remedy and could not be bypassed through the use of the
The court reasoned that, although the purpose of the
FDCPA.7
FDCPA is for consumer debtors to avoid bankruptcy, if bankruptcy does
occur, the debtor's remedies and protections fall under the Bankruptcy
Code. 9
Two years later, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit answered the question of whether the Bankruptcy Code preempts
the FDCPA when creditors violate provisions of the Bankruptcy Code."
In Randolph v. IMBS Inc., 1 the Seventh Circuit held that one federal
statute cannot preempt another as this would allow one statute to
impliedly repeal the other, and repeal by implication is rare. 2 The
court held that § 362(h) of the Bankruptcy Code," the automatic stay
provision, may overlap with the FDCPA but it was possible to enforce
Therefore, the
and comply with both statutes simultaneously."
Bankruptcy Code does not impliedly repeal the FDCPA.8"
In Simmons v. Roundup Funding LLC, 6 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit was forced to answer the question of
whether the FDCPA applied in the case of a consumer debt collector's
filing a proof of claim.8 7 In 2007, the Simmons filed for bankruptcy.
Roundup Funding, LLC (Roundup) filed a proof of claim in the bankruptcy proceeding for $2,039.21. The Simmons filed an objection to the
claim, and subsequently, the bankruptcy court reduced the claim to
$1,100. In response, the Simmons filed an action against Roundup,
alleging that Roundup had filed an inflated proof of claim. The
Simmons claimed filing the inflated proof of claim constituted a violation
of the FDCPA by misrepresenting the Simmons' debt.'
Although the question had yet to be answered on appeal, the Second
Circuit noted the weight of authority from the district courts that
supported Roundup's claim that the FDCPA did not apply in bankruptcy

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Id.
Id. at 510-11.
Id. at 510.
See Randolph v. IMBS Inc., 368 F.3d 726, 728 (7th Cir. 2004).
368 F.3d 726 (7th Cir. 2004).
Id. at 730.
11 U.S.C. § 362(h) (2012).
Randolph, 368 F.3d at 730.
Id. at 732-33.
622 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010).
Id. at 94.
Id. at 94-95.
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cases.8 9 The court agreed with the decisions of the district courts,
holding that the FDCPA was designed to protect debtors through
supplying remedies against abusive creditors.9" As such, in cases
where debtors are already protected by the Bankruptcy Code, there is no
need to supplement a debtor's remedies by allowing claims under the
FDCPA. 9 ' Furthermore, the Bankruptcy Code has remedies in place
for wrongfully filed proofs of claim, including the revocation of fraudulent claims and placing creditors in contempt. 92 The court held that the
FDCPA did not apply to proofs of claim as doing so would allow debtors
to bypass the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code in favor of more
"lucrative" claims under the FDCPA. 9'
Four years later, the Eleventh Circuit was tasked with answering the
same question in Crawford v.LVNV Funding,LLC; in responding, the
court would ignore the overwhelming majority of case law, unsteadying
what had been a solid body of law.
IV. COURT'S RATIONALE
Writing for the court in Crawford v. LVNV Funding, LLC, Judge
Goldberg noted a growing concern in bankruptcy cases: creditors selling
past-due accounts to consumer debt agencies for the purpose of filing
proofs of claim on those debts if and when the debtor filed for bankruptcy.94 Often, these claims are filed well after the end of the enforceable
statute of limitations period to collect on such debts.95 As Crawford's
issue fell into this category, the court posed the question of whether such
actions would pass scrutiny under the FDCPA.96 In its answer, the
court determined those actions would fail under the FDCPA"

89. Id. at 95-96 ("The Bankruptcy Code itself contemplates a creditor filing a proof of

claim on a time-barred debt and the Bankruptcy Court disallowing such claim after
objection from the debtor. It is difficult for this Court to understand how a procedure
outlined by the Bankruptcy Code could possibly form the basis of a violation under the
FDCPA.") (quoting B-Real, LLC, 405 B.R. at 431)).

90. Id. at 96.
91. See id.
92. Id.
93. Id. The FDCPA entitles an individual to actual damages, additional damages up
to one thousand dollars, the costs of the action, and reasonable attorney fees. 15 U.S.C.
§ 1692k(a)(1)-(3).
94. 758 F.3d at 1256-57.

95. Id. at 1256.
96. Id. at 1256-57.
97. Id. at 1257.
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The court began its analysis by looking to the purpose and language
of the FDCPA.9 8 The court discussed the advent of the FDCPA as an
attempt by Congress to prohibit the abusive, deceptive, and unfair
tactics employed by consumer debt collectors.9" In an effort to enforce
the protection of debtors, the FDCPA created a private right of action
against debt collectors for actual and statutory damages, as well as
attorney fees and expenses. 100 The court focused on § 1692e and
§ 1692f of the FDCPA.' ° ' Section 1692e prohibits the use of "false,
deceptive, or misleading representation[s] or means" to collect a debt;
while § 1692f is intended to keep a debt collector from using unfair and
unconscionable methods of debt collection. 10 2 However, the words
false, deceptive, and misleading are not defined in the FDCPA.' °3 The
court explained the use of the least-sophisticated consumer standard in
analyzing cases under the FDCPA as a remedy for the ambiguous
language of § 1692e and § 1692f.1'4 In explanation, the court acknowledged that the FDCPA was enacted to protect the typical consumer; as
such, the question determining the scope of the FDCPA is whether the
deceptive actions of the0 5debt collector would have deceived the leastsophisticated consumer.1
Next, the court shifted to determine whether LVNV's actions would
have deceived the least-sophisticated consumer, subjecting it to liability
under the FDCPA.' 6 Stepping into LVNV's shoes, the court discussed
the purpose behind LVNV's filing of the time-barred proof of claim.' 7
Section 502 of the Bankruptcy Code allows proofs of claim, even those
that are time-barred, to be automatically allowed against a debtor so
long as the debtor fails to object to the proof of claim.' 8 LVNV filed
its proof of claim anticipating Crawford's failure to object to the claim,
an anticipation that was fruitful.'
The court then looked to the vast amount of case law that held debt
collectors' threats to initiate actions, and the filing of actions in state

98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Id. at 1257-58.
Id. at 1257.
Id. at 1258.
Id.
Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1692e).
Id.; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1692a.'
Crawford, 758 F.3d at 1258.
Id. at 1258-59.
Id. at 1259.
Id.
Id.; see also 11 U.S.C. § 501(a).
Crawford, 758 F.3d at 1259.
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court to collect a time-barred debt, constituted violations of the
FDCPA." ° The court relied specifically on the Seventh Circuit's
rationale in Phillips v. Asset Acceptance, LLC,"' where the court
highlighted that stale (or time-barred) actions to collect consumer debts
were unfair under the FDCPA." 2
Applying the rationale behind the statute of limitations and the
reasoning in Phillips to the bankruptcy context, the court analogized
filing a time-barred suit in state court to the filing of a time-barred proof
of claim in bankruptcy.113 Filing a time-barred proof of claim gives the
debtor the false impression that the debt collector may legally collect the
debt, just as filing a time-barred suit in state court misleads the debtor
into believing the debt is actually enforceable."" The court found the
least-sophisticated debtor would not be aware that the debt is timebarred and would consequently fail to object to the proof of claim,
entitling an undeserving debt collector to funds from the Chapter 13
estate. 5 Not only would the distribution reduce the amount of the
estate for deserving creditors, but filing an objection to a time-barred
proof of claim would unnecessarily consume resources in a debtor's
bankruptcy case just as a limitations defense would do in state
court."" Therefore, the court held there was virtually no difference
between filing a time-barred proof of claim in a Chapter 13 bankruptcy
and filing a suit to collect a time-barred debt in state court." 7 Both
actions are unfair, unconscionable, deceptive, and misleading to the
least-sophisticated consumer, and thus, violations of the FDCPA."'
The court quickly dismissed LVNV's other arguments." 9 The court
stated that contrary to LVNV's belief, the proof of claim was a "collection
activity" regulated by the FDCPA because the claim was an effort to

110. Id. at 1259-60.
111. 736 F.3d 1076 (7th Cir. 2013).
112. Crawford, 758 F.3d at 1260. The court in Phillips reasoned that stale actions to
collect consumer debts were unfair under the FDCPA for the following reasons: the leastsophisticated consumer would not be aware that it could defend against the stale suit by
using the statute of limitations; without the statute of limitations defense the consumer
would submit to such suits; the consumer's memory would be dulled due to the passage of
time; and the time lapse would lessen the likelihood that the consumer maintained records
of the debt. Id. at 1260-61; Phillips, 736 F.3d at 1079.
113. Crawford, 758 F.3d at 1260-61.
114. Id. at 1261.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
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obtain payment from Crawford in a legal proceeding. 20 Such an effort
to collect payment placed LVNV within the definition of a debt collector
under the FDCPA. 12'1 The court also declined to find that the automatic stay provision of the Bankruptcy Code would be violated if the court
considered the filing of a proof of claim as a "means used in connection
with the collection of [a] debt.' 22 The court recognized that the
automatic stay provision disallows actions to be filed against the debtor
outside the bankruptcy proceeding."'2 Filing a proof of claim is the
initial step in collecting from a debtor in bankruptcy and, as such, is a
means to collect a debt in bankruptcy under the FDCPA; however, the
automatic stay does not prohibit the filing of a proof of claim because the
action is within the bankruptcy proceeding.'2'
The court ultimately concluded that LVNV violated the FDCPA with
its time-barred claim.12 ' Holding that the filing of a time-barred claim
subjects a consumer debt collector to liability under the FDCPA, the
In so doing, the Elevcourt of appeals reversed the district court."
to the
the FDCPA
to
apply
enth Circuit became the first circuit court
27
proceeding.'
bankruptcy
consumer
a
in
claim
of
filing of a proof
V. IMPLICATIONS

The implications from the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Crawford v.
LVNV Funding, LLC are not yet clear, but the case could have major
ramifications throughout the field of bankruptcy law. The ruling in
Crawford went against the "elephantine body of persuasive authority"
that weighed against the finding that the FDCPA applied to proofs of
claim."2 However, the case has already received favorable treatment,
and from outside the Eleventh Circuit no less.' 29 The United States
District Court for the Southern District of Indiana relied heavily on the

120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1692c (internal quotation marks omitted).
123. Id. at 1261-62.
124. Id. at 1262.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. See id.; Simmons, 622 F.3d at 96.
128. 11th Circuit:Proofof Claim May Violate FDCPA, BANKRUPTCY COURT DECISIONS,
July 30, 2014, at 5-6 (quoting Crawford v. LVNV Funding, LLC, Nos. 2:12-CV-701-WKW,
2:12-CV-729-WKW, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66169, at *4 (M.D. Ala. May 9, 2013)).
129. See, e.g., Patrick v. PYOD, LLC, No. 1:14-CV-00539-RYL-TAB, 2014 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 116092, at *7 (S.D. Ind.Aug. 20, 2014).
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holding of Crawford in Patrick v. PYOD, LLC 13 ° to find that a debtor
stated a valid claim under § 1692e when a consumer debt collector filed
two proofs of claim on time-barred debts in the debtor's Chapter 13
bankruptcy."' 1 Although the court in Patrick declared the decision in
Crawford to be factually on point to the debtor's situation, there was one
major factual distinction the district court failed to recognize-the
debtor's bankruptcy attorney objected to the time-barred proofs of claim
and the claims were disallowed. 3 2 Neither Crawford nor the Chapter
13 trustee had objected to LVNV's proofs of claim.133
The Bankruptcy Code provides for situations like Crawford where a
creditor or debt collector files an invalid proof of claim.' 3 In that
situation, § 502 of the Bankruptcy Code allows debtors to object to proofs
of claim as unenforceable. 3 5 The bankruptcy court will then determine the validity of those claims and enforce only those that are
valid. 36 However, when a debtor, or the bankruptcy trustee, fails to
object to unenforceable proofs of claim, the claims are allowed and
deemed valid. 37 Being able to object to unenforceable proofs of claim
gives a debtor a remedy for the exact situation faced in Crawford. 38
If either Crawford or the Chapter 13 trustee had done their homework
and researched the background behind the proofs of claim that were
filed, Crawford could have objected to LVNV's claims and, more likely
than not, the claims would have been disallowed.'39
When Crawford failed to object, the claims were allowed. 4 ° After
discovering he had been cheated, Crawford sought a way to recover for
a mistake caused by his own lack of due diligence by using the
FDCPA.' 4
The FDCPA was not meant to apply to such situations. 4 2 The FDCPA was enacted to curb abuses by consumer debt
collectors; 4 3 however, its main purpose is to protect consumer debtors

130. No. 1:14-CV-00539-RYL-TAB, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116092 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 20,
2014).

131. Id. at *2, *6-9.
132. Id. at *2.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Crawford, 758 F.3d at 1259 & n.5.
See 11 U.S.C. § 502.
Id. § 502(a).
Id. § 502(a)-(b).
See Lampe, 665 F.3d at 514.
See Simmons, 622 F.3d at 96.
See 11 U.S.C. § 502(a)-(b).
Crawford, 758 F.3d at 1259.

141. See id.
142. See Simmons, 622 F.3d at 96; B-Real, 405 B.R. at 432; see also Middlebrooks v.
Interstate Credit Control, Inc., 391 B.R. 434, 437 (D. Minn. 2008).
143. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e).
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from abusive practices as an attempt to keep consumer debtors out of
personal bankruptcy.1" When the Eleventh Circuit applied the FDCPA
to Crawford's proof of claim, it did so to remedy an unfair situation.'45
LVNV's filing of a proof of claim was indeed an abusive practice in the
collection of a debt, but it was not an abusive practice the FDCPA was
meant to remedy.146
Stated another way, the ruling in Crawford contradicts the legal rule
that where there is an adequate remedy at law, equitable relief is
The Bankruptcy Code and the Federal Rules of
unavailable. 4 '
Bankruptcy Procedure offer a remedy at law for debtors in bankruptcy
by providing sanctions and non-monetary remedies for debtors when
creditors violate provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. 4 ' For instance,
the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure explicitly permit the recovery
of monetary and non-monetary sanctions, including reasonable attorney
fees and other expenses, for filing a petition, pleading, or other paper
with the court that is frivolous or presented for an improper purpose. 49 On the other hand, Crawford relied on the FDCPA for a
monetary remedy because the FDCPA allows a cause of action for actual
damages, statutory damages, and reasonable attorney fees. 5 ' However, the Bankruptcy Code expressly provided Crawford with an adequate

144. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692(a); see also Kokoszka, 417 U.S. at 651.
145. See generally Crawford, 758 F.3d at 1256-57.
A deluge has swept through U.S. bankruptcy courts of late. Consumer debt buyers-armed with hundreds of delinquent accounts purchased from creditors-are

filing proofs of claim on debts deemed unenforceable under state statutes of
limitations. This appeal considers whether a proof of claim to collect a stale debt
in Chapter 13 bankruptcy violates the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ....

Id.
146.
2009).

See Jacques v. U.S. Bank N.A. (In re Jacques), 416 B.R. 63, 80 (Bankr. E.D. N.Y.

Here, the Plaintiffs FDCPA claim, as alleged in the Complaint, arises from the
Defendants' filing of a proof of claim and the contents of that claim, and not from
the kind of postpetition wrongful conduct upon which courts have relied to find
that an FDCPA claim may be asserted in a bankruptcy case. Each of the
Plaintiffs particularized allegations relates to the proof of claim, and each can be
addressed by the claims adjudication process of the Bankruptcy Code.

Id. (footnote omitted).
147.

See Mitsubishi Int'l Corp. v. Cardinal Textile Sales, 14 F.3d 1507, 1518 (11th Cir.

1994).
148. See 11 U.S.C. § 105(a); FED. R. BANKR. P. 9011(c). Under § 105, bankruptcy courts
have the power to issue orders and judgments that the court deems necessary or

appropriate to carry out the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. 11 U.S.C. § 105(a).
149. FED. R. BANKS. 9011(b)-(c).
150. Crawford, 758 F.3d at 1258.
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remedy at law-the right to object to the invalid proof of claim.1"'
Nevertheless, instead of relying on this remedy, Crawford relied on the
FDCPA to achieve a remedy he could not attain under the Bankruptcy
Code.'52 In holding that the FDCPA applies to a time-barred proof of
claim, the Eleventh Circuit did precisely what the court in Walls v. Wells
Fargo Bank, N.A cautioned against when it stated, "To permit a
simultaneous claim under the FDCPA would allow through the back
door what [a debtor] cannot accomplish through the front door ... ""'
In essence, the Eleventh Circuit's decision allowed Crawford to reach
around the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code through the use of the
FDCPA. That is not the kind of remedy the FDCPA was intended to
produce. 5 4
Aside from allowing Crawford to side-step the Bankruptcy Code, the
Eleventh Circuit's ruling poses additional issues that the court failed to
address. If debtors are entitled to recover under the FDCPA for a
consumer debt collector's filing of a proof of claim, does that force the
other provisions of the FDCPA to apply in bankruptcy proceedings as
well? If a debtor is allowed to recover under the FDCPA for filing of a
proof of claim, must a creditor, who is also a consumer debt collector, file
its proof of claim in accordance with the more in depth notice provisions
of § 1692g 155 of the FDCPA? 5 s The bottom line is that allowing
debtors to recover under the FDCPA could cause added procedural
hardships on creditors in bankruptcy and open creditors to liability
under the FDCPA for actions that meet the requirements of the
Bankruptcy Code. Such a result stands in opposition to the Congressional intent behind the enactment of the FDCPA.'57 The FDCPA was
meant to apply outside the context of bankruptcy, not as an addition to

151. Id. at 1262; see 11 U.S.C. § 502(a)-(b).
152. See Crawford, 758 F.3d at 1256.
153. 267 F.3d at 510.
154. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692(a), (e). The remedies under the FDCPA were intended to
protect consumers from consumer debt collectors in attempts to keep consumer debtors
from filing for personal bankruptcies. See generally Kokoszka, 417 U.S. at 651.
155. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g (2012).
156. Under § 1692g(a), a consumer debt collector seeking to recover a debt is required
to send the consumer a written notice containing the following: the amount of the debt; the
name of the creditor owed the debt; a statement that unless the consumer, within thirty
days of the receipt of notice, "disputes the validity of the debt, or any portion thereof," the
debt is assumed to be valid; a statement informing the debtor that in response to disputed
debts, the debt collector will provide verification of the debt or a copy of a judgment against
the debtor; and a statement that the debt collector will provide the consumer with the
name and address of the original creditor, if the consumer requests the information in
writing. 15 U.S.C. 1692g(a).
157. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692(a).
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those provisions currently laid out in the Bankruptcy Code. 8 As
such, the holding of Crawford poses more questions than it answers,
begging the additional question of whether Crawford was truly a good
ruling.
The backdrop of the decision in Crawford pits two quandaries against
each other. On one hand, there is the nature of consumer debt collectors
buying invalid debts to file a proof of claim on the debt in bankruptcy
and collect the invalid debt amount from the bankruptcy estate. On the
other, there stands the issue of debtors side-stepping the Bankruptcy
Code to collect damages unavailable under the Bankruptcy Code.
Finally, there is the issue of courts using equitable powers to stop what
they view as unfair practices.
As noted in the first sentence of Crawford, the practices of consumer
debt collectors are, to some extent, abusive practices that are unfair to
debtors. 5 9 Ethically, it is unjust to use the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code to collect debts that are invalid under state law. However,
the court in Crawford allowed the debtor an equitable remedy when a
remedy at law was available. 60 That is not to say that a debtor
should be devoid of a remedy for abusive practices in the collection of a
debt, but it is unclear whether the court's decision in Crawford is the
best way to discourage the unjust collection practices of consumer debt
collection agencies. Did the court overstep its authority and err in
issuing an equitable remedy under the FDCPA to right a wrong
committed under the Bankruptcy Code? Perhaps the court in Crawford
is correct in its rationale to allow debtors to collect under the FDCPA in
hopes that debt collectors will stop filing proofs of claims on invalid
debts. It is possible that the continued claims under the FDCPA by
individuals in bankruptcy cases point to the conclusion that the remedies
under the FDCPA better meet the needs of debtors. Perhaps the answer
lies in courts better policing the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code to

158. See Simmons, 622 F.3d at 96.
The FDCPA is designed to protect defenseless debtors and to give them remedies
against abuse by creditors. There is no need to protect debtors who are already
under the protection of the bankruptcy court, and there is no need to supplement
the remedies afforded by bankruptcy itself.
... Debtors in bankruptcy proceedings do not need protection from abusive
collection methods that are covered under the FDCPA because the claims process
is highly regulated and court controlled. While the FDCPA's purpose is to protect
unsophisticated consumers from unscrupulous debt collectors, that purpose is not

implicated when a debtor is instead protected by the court system and its officers.
Id. (quoting B-Real, 405 B.R. at 432).
159. See generally Crawford, 758 F.3d at 1256.

160. Id. at 1262.
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halt the unjust and abusive practices of consumer debt collectors. Or the
answer may lie in allowing Congress to pass new provisions of the
Bankruptcy Code to stop these abusive tactics or amend the available
remedies under the Bankruptcy Code to resemble those available under
the FDCPA.
Whatever the answer, the court's decision in Crawford makes one
thing clear: it is necessary to take action that will avoid a partial
dismantling of the Bankruptcy Code. If consumer debtors are allowed to
bypass the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, certain provisions could
be rendered ineffective and obsolete.' 61 If debtors who fail to object to
unenforceable or invalid proofs of claim are allowed to recover under the
FDCPA, then there will be no need or incentive for debtors to object to
proofs of claim under § 502 of the Bankruptcy Code; such a result would
render § 502 virtually obsolete.'62 That result cannot have been what
the court in Crawford had in mind when its decision was written.
However, there may be a way to reconcile the FDCPA with the
Bankruptcy Code that will avoid such a result. The court in Randolph,
found that where provisions of the Bankruptcy Code and the FDCPA
overlap, and it is possible to comply with both, courts can enforce both
statutes.163 If it were found that the FDCPA and the Bankruptcy Code
overlap in the context of filing proofs of claim, and the court enforces
both statutes, courts could potentially grant remedies under the FDCPA
without damaging the Bankruptcy Code. However, in making such
rulings, bankruptcy courts must not ignore the applicability of the
Bankruptcy Code in its entirety like the court did in Crawford.
At its heart, the decision in Crawford comes down to a single issue:
the Eleventh Circuit was blinded by Crawford's inequitable situation,
Nevertheless, Crawford's
which resulted from unfair practices.
unfortunate situation was of his own making. If the decision in
Crawfordis allowed to stand, it will promote courts to legislate in equity

161. See Middlebrooks, 391 B.R. at 437 (noting that allowing debtors to allege violations
of the FDCPA in bankruptcy proceedings could "potentially undermine" certain provisions

of the Bankruptcy Code (quoting Molloy v. Primus Auto. Fin. Servs., 247 B.R. 804, 820
(C.D. Cal. 2000)).
162. See id.
In other words, permitting an FDCPA action based on a bankruptcy proof of claim
could discourage creditors from filing claims. . and encourage debtors to ignore
the procedural safeguards within the Bankruptcy Code, such as the right to object
to proofs of claim and to seek sanctions against creditors who violate provisions
within the Bankruptcy Code, in favor of the FDCPA.
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Rice-Etherly v. Bank One (Inre Rice-Etherly), 336 B.R.
308, 312 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
163. Randolph, 368 F.3d at 731.
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when remedies at law are available. Furthermore, by allowing Crawford
to reach around the Bankruptcy Code for a favorable ruling, the
Eleventh Circuit has set the stage for a massive slippery slope that could
take the debate over bankruptcy law and the FDCPA further down the
rabbit hole to unknown consequences. The Bankruptcy Code provides
remedies for abused and deceived debtors and was intended to provide
a debtor's sole remedies. Without a ruling that both the FDCPA and the
Bankruptcy Code apply, allowing a debtor to collect under the FDCPA
while simultaneously ignoring the Bankruptcy Code should not be
allowed. In the wake of Crawford, debtors should be required to exhaust
those remedies laid out in the Bankruptcy Code, and courts must stay
strong even when the debtor's circumstances pull at heart-strings.
BRITTANY M. DANT

